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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents are the owners of certain building lots 
located in Roosevelt City, which were conveyed by the 
appellants. Respondents claim that appellants breached 
their covenant against encumbrances by their failure to 
pay the assessments for curb, gutter, and paving improve-
ments levied by Roosevelt City. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court held that the creation and function-
ing of Roosevelt Special Improvement District No. 1 in 
April of 1974 established an encumbrance on the property, 
even though said encumbrance was two years prior to the 
earliest date that the Special Improvement District could 
levy an assessment under §§10-16-12 and 10-16-23, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953 as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Amicus Curiae, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota 
seeks to have the Judgment of the District Court reversed 
and the provisions of the Municipal Special Improvement 
District Act established as the sole procedure whereby 
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STATEHENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae agrees with the statement of facts as 
it is presented in the Appellants' Brief. 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING IS CONTRARY TO STATUTE 
In 1969, the Utah State Legislature passed the Munici-
pal Improvement District Act, hereinafter "Act", with the 
following stated purpose: 
... to rev::.se, codify and improve existing 
laws relating to Municipal Special Improve-
ment Districts, to recognize existing prac-
tices relating to such districts and to 
modernize and improve such laws in light of 
such practice ... §10-16-2, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended. 
Part of the clarification provided by the Act is the specific 
procedure to be followed by muncipalities to encumber real 
property in order to pay for improvements. Since the statute 
establishes a given procedure for placing ar, encumbrance or 
lien against property w~thin the District, it is inaporopriate 
for the trial court to hold in direct opposition to the statute. 
One of the most important parts of the Act, and one of 
the points of greatest concern because of the likelihood of 
potential litigation, is the procedure whereby money may be 
collected to finance improvements made by a District. The 
legislature, in an attempt to give the maximum guidance to 
-2-
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the municipalities, specifically enumerated the events which 
must occur before a District may lev; an assessment. Section 
10-16-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, provides three 
alternative times when a municipality may levy: 
WHEN ASSESSMENTS MAY BE LEVIED - Assessments 
for improvements in a Special Improvement 
District may be levied: 
(1) At any time after all contracts 
for the making of the improvements have 
been let, the property price for all 
property acquired to make the improve-
ments has been finallv determined and 
the reasonable cost of any work to be 
done by the municipality has been de-
termined; or 
(2) For light service or park main-
tenance, at any time after the light 
service or park maintenance has com-
menced; or 
(3) At any time after all of the im-
provements in the Special Improvement 
District are entirely completed and 
accepted. / 
After listing these three alternatives when the municipality 
I 
may levy, the legislature explained the consequences of levy-
ing an assessment in §10-16-23, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as 
amended: 
ASSESSMENT CONSTITUTES LIEN AGAINST PROPER-
TY -PRIORITY -An assessment, any interest 
accruing on the assessment and the cost 
of the assessment shall constitute a lien 
on and against the property upon which the 
assessme~t is levied on the effective 
date of the ordinance levying the 
-3-
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assessment, •.-Jhich lien shall be superior 
to the lien of any trust deed, mortgage, 
mechanic's or materialman's lien, or other 
encumbrance and shall be equal to and on 
a parity with the lien for general property 
taxes. Such lien shall continue until the 
assessment and any interest on the assess-
ment is paid notwithstanding any sale of 
the property for or on account of a general 
property tax, special tax, other assessment 
or the issuance of an auditor's deed. 
(emphasis added) 
The Special Improvement District does not have any 
monetarv cc:ntrol over the property until an assessment has 
been levied. Prior to the levy there is no way for the 
District to effect the property right of an owner whose 
property is located within the District. 
In the instant case, the ordinance levying the assess-
ment was adopted subsequent to the conveyance of the real 
property by the appellants. It is also significant to note 
that the conveyance took place before any of the three al-
ternative events authorized by H0-16-12 Utah Code Ann., 
1953, as amended, had occurred. 
The trial court in its fifth conclusion of law held in 
direct opposition to the aforementioned statute: 
5. That by reason of said Special Improve-
ment District existing and functioning at 
the time the defendants conveyed to each 
of the plaintiffs or their predecessors in 
interest, defendants breached their covenant 
against encumbrances as provided for in 
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In an attempt to support the holding of the Court, which 
is in direct opposition to the statute, the respondents 
employ two lines of argument. The first line attempts to 
distinguish an encumbrance from a lien and thereby circum-
vent §10-16-23. The second line cites cases from other 
jurisdictions which allegedly support the trial court. 
The respondents fail in their first attempt because they 
cannot establish that there was either an encumbrance or 
a lien on the property at the time of the conveyance. They 
fail in their second attempt because the cases from other 
jurisdictions are either inapposite or they are from juris-
dictions that do not have a statute like the Utah Municipal 
Improvement District Act. 
In analyzing the respondents' first line of reasoning, 
it is necessary to ask, "How does the existence and function-
ing of a Special Improvement District encumber the property?" 
The respondents admit there was no lien, but say there was 
an encumbrance. The definition of an encumbrance used by 
respondents in their argument undermines rather than sustains 
their point. The respondents quote from Black's Law Dictionary, 
revised fourth edition, which defines encumbrances as: 
Any right to or interest in, land which 
may subsist in another to the diminution 
of its value, but consistent with the 
passing of fee. (Respondents' Brief, p. 4) 
-5-
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There is no evidence to show that the existence of 
the District caused a diminution in value of the property, 
and, if it did not lessen the value of the property, it has 
not encumbered the property according to respondents' defini-
tion. 
In fact, according to respondents' definition, the 
creation of a District no doubt significantly increased the 
value of land. Property improved with curb, gutter and a 
paved road ~s more valuable to the respondents than the same 
property without these improvements. This increase in value 
because of the improvements would more than offset the mone-
tary burden placed on the property to pay for the improve-
ments. That monetary burden could only be effective after 
an assessment had been levied pursuant to §10-16-23. 
In answer to the respondents' second line of reasoning, 
the cases which the respondents cite are either inapposite 
or distinguishable. In Clark v. Fisher, 54 Kan. 408, 38 P 493 
(cited at page 5 of Respondents' Brief), the Kansas Court 
concerns itself with the enforcement of a lease provision 
which survives the sale of the real property. The provision 
was a part of the agreement between the parties and did not 
constitute a lien which the buyer had to pay. In the instant 
case there is a specific finding that there was no meeting of 
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In O'Shay v. Chandoir, 104 So. 59(Ky) the Court held 
that the "vendee contracted to purchase a lot of ground 
on a paved street." The Kentucky Court's holding was based 
on contract. The Court held that the vendee should get what 
he bargained for and what the vendor said he had to convey. 
In the instant case there was no meeting of the minds re-
garding who would pay for the improvements and no evidence 
on the question of who would pay the assessment and how that 
would affect the purchase of the lot. 
Respondents then cite two Massachusetts cases, Cotting 
v. Commonwealth, 205 Mass. 423, 91 N.E. 900, and Engel v. 
Thompson, 146 N.E. 2nd 657 (Mass.), and claim they constitute 
the majority rule. Massachusetts does not have a statute 
equivalent to Utah's Municipal Improvement District Act, there-
fore the Massachusetts cases and the rule they represent are 
not relevant. The legislature has decided what the policy 
should be in the State of Utah. It has mandated to municipali-
ties when an assessment may be levied (§10-16-12) and the 
effect of the levy (§10-16-23). Courts without such a clear 
statutory injunction may be persuaded that property is encum-
bered before an assessment is levied. However, the Utah law 
is clear on the events which must occur before a Special 
Improvement District may encumber real property located with-
in the District. 
-7-
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WENT BEYOND THE 
PLEADINGS. 
The plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
was based on the theory that the defendants had agreed to 
pay for curb, gutter and paving improvements and their 
failure to so pay was a breach of the covenant against 
encumbrances in the warranty deeds. The plaintiffs' prayer 
was that the defendants be required to fulfill their ver-
bal agreement and pay for the improvements. The evidence 
introduced by the plaintiffs was also based on this theory. 
Although the trial court found that the defendants had 
not represented, promised or agreed to pay for such improve-
ments, the court went beyond the pleadings and held that the 
property had been encumbered since April 1974 when the Roose-
velt Special Improvement District had been created. Thus, 
the trial court's holding was based on a theory neither con-
tained in the pleading nor directly addressed by either the 
plaintiffs or the defendants. 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings 
are tried by express or imply consent of 
the parties, they shall be treated in all 
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The purpose of an amendment to conform to the proof is to 
bring the pleadings in line with the actual issues upon 
which the case is tried. However, the rule does not cover 
a situation like the one in the present case. Such an im-
plied amendment of the pleadings should only be allowed when 
it is not prejudicial to either party. 
In determining whether or not there has been an implied 
amendment to the pleadings 3 Moore's Federal Practice, para. 
15.13, page 847 states: 
The test should be whether the defendant 
would be prejudiced by the implied amend-
ment, i.e., whether he had a fair oppor-
tunity to defend and whether he could 
offer any additional evidence if the case 
were to be retried on a different theory. 
In this case the defendants were prejudiced by the court's 
holding being based on a theory not contained in the plead-
ings. If the case were to be retried on the theory that the 
mere creation and functioning of the Special Improvement 
District created an encumbrance on real property within the 
District, the defendants could present the Resolution itself 
as evidence. 
The trial court did not have before it a copy of the 
Resolution creating a Special Improvement District. If the 
case were retried, the court would have the language of the 
Resolution and be able to determine the intent of Roosevelt 
-9-
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City. This additional evidence could have been introduced 
at the trial court by the defendants and have been a signi-
ficant aid to the Judge in making a decision with regard to 
the Resolution, 
The court erred in going beyond the pleadings. There 
was no implied consent on behalf of the defendants to allow 
the pleadings to be treated as if they raised the issue of 
the encumbrance attaching as of the creation and functioning 
of the Special Jis:rict. The plaintiffs should not be able 
to recover where the evidence establishes a wholly different 
case from that which they alleged, and where the defendants 
have been misled and prejudiced thereby. See, Mile v. 
California Growers Wineries, 114 P.2d 651 (Ca. 1941); Reilly 
v. Maw, 405 P.2d. 440 0'1ont. 1965). 
POINT III: THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
DID NOT CONSITUTE A PRESENT ENCUMBRANCE OF THE PROPERTY. 
The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, held in its second 
conclusion of law: 
"That the creation and functioning of 
the Roosevelt City Special Improvement 
District No. 1 from and after April, 
1974, created an encumbrance on the 
subject properties, notwithstanding 
that the Ordinance assessing the lien 
had not been adopted. 
-10-
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In order to determine whether the court erred in the afore-
mentioned conclusion of law, it is necessary to examine the 
Resolution itself. If the Resolution merely created the 
possibility of an encumbrance,then there would be no breach 
of the covenant against encumbrances in the warranty deeds 
from the defendants to the plaintiffs and the defendants would 
not be liable for the assessment on the respective properties. 
Section 2 of the Resolution provides: 
... that the City could, at any time 
hereafter, exclude any portion of 
the City from the District. (Appendix 
A, Appellants' Brief). 
This reservation within the Resolution itself negates the 
possibility that all property was immediately encumbered. 
The properties to be assessed under the Resolution were not 
determined by the Resolution itself since it provided that 
some parts of the City may be excluded from the District. 
The assertion of future intent to assess some properties and 
levy on them is not the equivalent of a present encumbrance, 
nor could it have established present liability to an eventual 
lien on all properties in Roosevelt City. 
Another section of the Resolution is also essential in 
determining whether or not it created a present encumbrance. 
Section 4 provides in part: 
-11-
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... that the City is hereby authorized 
in~ue cours~ to levy assessments upon 
~escribeain the Notice of 
Inn~-fic~on to pay for--the -i!i1pTOVements 
to 15e made, and- the City officials of 
said City are hereby directed to proceed 
to construct the said improvements. 
Again the intent of the Resolution is discernible on its 
face. The City was authorized in due course to levy assess-
ments. The statutory authority granted by the Resolution is 
permissive rather than mandatory. It relates to the future 
and indicates that the property will be encumbered "in due 
course" rather than relating to the present and to an innne-
diate encumbrance. 
The language of the Resolution itself coincides with 
the procedure set up by the Utah State Legislature for es-
tablishing a lien for municipal improvements, Section 10-16-23, 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. The "in due course" lan-
guage would be equivalent to the statute which indicates the 
property would be encumbered" ... on the effective date of the 
ordinance levying the assessments ... " 
In a recent Maryland decision, Strass et al v. District-
Realty Title Insurance Corporation, 31 Md. App 690, 353A. 2nd 
(1976), the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland had to deter-
mine when assessments levied by the City of Rockville for the 
construction of water and sewer lines became liens or encum-
brances on real property, This case had a similar factual 
-12-
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situation to the instant case except that the suit was 
on the covenant against encumbrances in the Title Insur-
ance policy rather than the covenant a~ainst encumbrances 
in a warranty deed. The Court of Special Appeals held 
that the assessments were not encumbrances until they were 
inevitable and that as long as the City had the option to 
levy them or not, they were not inevitable. In the Strass 
case the court determined that a close look at the Ordinance 
granting the City Authority to assess liens was essential. 
Since the language of the Ordinance was permissive rather 
than mandatory. the court held that the property was not 
encumbered until the assessment was inevitable and the 
assessment was not inevitable until the date that it was 
levide. 
The language of the Resolution passed by Roosevelt 
City in the instant case was permissive in the same way that 
the Ordinance of the City of Rockville was permissive in the 
Strass case. The decision of the Maryland court was based 
on strict statutory interpretation. A close look at the 
wording of the Resolution of Roosevelt City itself demonstrates 
that it Has in fact permissive and not mandatory and the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Duchesne County, State 
of Utah, erred in holding that the properties involved were 
immediately encumbered on the passage of the Resolution. 
-13-
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POINT IV: UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT WOULD UNDERMINE THE 
MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT ACT &~ ADVERSELY EFFECT 
THE CONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY. 
In an area of law as fraught with the possibility of 
litigation as the conveyance of real property, statutes and 
decisional law should promote clarity and lessen the need 
for litigation, If the law defines the parameters rNithin 
which people can convey real property and determine who 
will be responsible for certain payments at the time of con-
veyance, there will be less litigation. In the instant case, 
if the trial court's holding were to be sustained, it would 
establish a second method for a Special Improvement District 
to encumber real property. Property would become encumbered 
on the creation of the Special Improvement District, although 
the amount of the encumbrance would be unknown. Rather than 
clarifying the law, this decision undermines the statutory 
procedure for encumbering real property under the Municipal 
Improvement District Act and significantly interferes with 
the conveyance of real property. 
The superiority of the statutory position is obvious. 
It establishes a date certain for the creation of a lien and 
an amount certain. If anyone is interested in finding out 
whether or not certain property is encumbered by a lien and 
the amount of that lien, they can check the County Recorder's 
-14-
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Office. Any purchaser of real property can have the title 
to the property searched to determine if there are any 
special assessments and any assessment can be paid at the 
time of purchase. 
If the trial court were to be sustained, purchasers and 
sellers would not be certain of their positions as of the 
date of conveyance. When two and one-half years pass be-
tween the creation of a Special Improvement District and the 
levy of the assessment, as in this case, real estate closings 
may not become final for two and one-half years or more. If 
a closing is handled by a realtor or title insurance company, 
money, in an undetermined amount, would have to be held in 
escrow awaiting the time when the assessment would be levied. 
It is almost certain to create litigation in sales handled 
by the owner himself. The existence of a Special Improvement 
District would probably remain unknown until the assessment 
is levied, 
The trial court's decision, if upheld, would also have 
a detrimental effect on the issuance of title insurance with-
in the state. Until a Special Improvement District assessment 
is levied,it is not of record and will not be revealed by a 
title search. At the present time title insurers are charged 
with knowledge of record title and must insure against any and 
all encumbrances of record. Under the trial court's holding 
15-
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title insurance companies would be forced to keep a record 
of the actions of every municipality and every district 
with authority to levy an assessment against real property. 
A list of the types of districts with authority to levy 
against real property appears at page 16 and 17 of Appellants' 
Brief. 
Respondents have argued in their reply to Title Insur-
ance Company of Minnesota's Motion for Leave to File Brief, 
that title insurance companies should except this possible 
encumbrance from the coverage of their policies. If respon-
dents' reasoning were followec,insurance companies would 
make exceptions for anything which might create a risk and 
thereby would defeat the purpose of insurance. A better rea-
soned approach would be to sustain the procedure outlined in 
the Municipal Special Improvement District Act for establish-
ing a lien on real property. This procedure removes uncer-
tainty and reinforces the certainty that a title search of 
the record title will accurately reflect the status of title 
at the time of closing. 
Another untenable situation would exist with respect to 
land which is ostensibly within a newly created Special Im-
provement District wherein the Resolution creating the District 
contains a reservation similar to the one in the instant case: 
-16-
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... that the City could at any time 
hereafter, exclude any portion of 
the City from the District. 
(Appendix A, Appellants' Brief) 
It would be unjust to deprive an owner of part of the sell-
ing price for a two and one-half year period on the mere 
possibility that there may be an assessment on property 
he has sold which may or may not be within the boundaries 
of the Special Improvement District. There would also be 
frequent disagreements as to the amount escrowed, the pur-
chaser wanting a higher amount than the seller. As there is 
no formula for arriving at a just figure to cover assessments 
to be levied in the future, the possibility for difficulties 
at a closing would be increased. 
A seller of real property would also be disadvantaged in 
setting a price on a presently unimproved lot which is lo-
cated within a Special Improvement District. He would be in 
the position of trying to raise his asking price commensurate 
with monies he would be required to pay in the future when 
the assessment is finally levied. 
The statutory procedure established by the State Legisla-
ture is also superior in that the party who gets the benefit 
of the improvements also has the burden of paying for them. 
Under the Municipal Improvement District Act the reasonable 
cost of the work to be done has to be determined or the 
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improvement has to be made before the assessment can be 
levied. Consequently, the person who has possession when 
the assessment is levied either has the benefit of the im-
provements for his own use, or, if he wishes to sell, he 
·has the benefit of the improvements to increase the fair 
market value of the property. 
If the trial court were sustained, an owner who gets no 
benefit from the improvements personally would have the 
burden of paying for them. Even if he were to advertise 
that the lot was within a Special Improvement District and 
that at some future time would have curb, gutter and paving, 
he could not guarantee how many years it would be before 
said improvements would be made. He could not ask the same 
price as if the improvements. had already been installed. 
Respondents argue that their rights are rights founded 
in warranty and not in fairness. They argue that the coven-
ant against encumbrances in a warranty deed mandated by 
§57-l-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, covers this situa-
tion. It is important to note that the covenant in a warranty 
deed is a covenant in praesenti. The covenant against encum-
brances says there are no liens or encumbrances on the date 
of conveyance. The warranty does not cover all potential future 
liens. It is broken, if at all, at the time of conveyance. 
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Since tl1e legislature has provided that a lien for the 
Irnprovement S·istrict, as tJrovided by the Act, is created 
only at the time of assessment, it is a future lien, which 
is not covered by the warranties in the deeds. 
wnen the legislature has enacted a detailed method 
for encumbering real property within a Special lmprove-
ment District, and that me.thod provides for certainty be-
t~Yeen a buyer and a seller as to the date that the encum-
brance comes into ef~ect and the amount of that encumbrance, 
it would be unwise to cloud that procedure by establishing 
a second means for encumbering real property located within 
such a district. The decision of the trial court in this case, 
if swstair-ed, would have an unfortunate effect on the convey-
ance of real property within the State of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The Municipal Special Improvement District Act was 
passed by the Utah State Legislature with the intent to 
clarify and modernize procedures followed by such districts. 
The Act provides a specific procedure for encumbering real 
property located within the District. This procedure is 
definite in stating when a District may assess property 
within it, and it is definite in stating how the assessment 
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may be levied. The trial court acknowledged the procedure 
outlined by the Act but decided that in this case the proper-
ty was encumbered upon the creation and functioning of the 
Roosevelt Special Improvement District No. l. 
Amicus Curiae, Title Insurance Company of Minnesota, 
submits that the trial court should be reversed because its 
holding is contrary to statute. Further, the decision of 
the trial court obscures rather than clarifies the respective 
rights of parties involved in the conveyance of property 
situated within Special Improvement Districts. Amicus Curiae 
would also urge the Court to recognize §§10-16-12 and 10-16-23 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended, as the sole method for en-
cumbering real property located within Special Improvement 
Districts in the State of Utah. 
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